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of the ecclesiastical courts from which our society has long since tran-
scended. To allow the police to "inadvertently" omit one of the Mir-
anda warnings, in effect, is to strip the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
of all meaning.
Further, Tucker cannot be reconciled with the Court's ruling in
Wong Sun. The use of Tucker's statement to learn the identity of Hen-
derson is clearly a part of "the fruits of the poisonous tree" as was the
evidence derived from the illegal arrest in Wong Sun. To allow the
police to use Henderson as a witness against Tucker is to allow Tucker
to incriminate himself through his own statements and to help make
the prosecution's case a clear vi6lation of the accused's rights under the
Fifth Amendment.
Clearly, the Tucker decision represents a blotch on the theory that
the courts are the ultimate protectors of -the rights of an accused person.
The majority speaking through Rehnquist felt that by allowing -the re-
spondent an opportunity to attack Henderson's credibility by confronta-
tion and cross-examination was to keep Tucker's Fifth Amendment
rights secure and safe. Thus the court either inadvertently or know-
ingly overlooked the fact that confrontation and cross-examination
come at a later stage in the criminal process. Henderson's testimony
should have been suppressed ab initio. Obviously, an accused's Fifth
Amendment rights need protecting before trial during in-custody -in-
terrogation if Miranda is to be regarded as no more than vacuous dicta.
If police are continually allowed to omit one or more of the Miranda
guidelines, the effect would be constitutionally debilitating.
The Court's reasoning in Tucker was not only unsound but if fol-
lowed in future decisions, will prove to be erosive of an accused's Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights as guaranteed by the Constitution.
QUENTIN T. SUMNER
Class Actions and the Amount In Controversy
The question raised by Zahn v. International Paper Company1 has
important effects upon the future of class actions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically those grounded upon diversity ju-
risdiction. The central issue in the case is whether or not every person
represented as plaintiffs in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must meet
1 . Zahn v. International Paper Company, 404 U.S. 291, 94 S. Ct. 505, 38 L. Ed.
2d 505 (1973).
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the jurisdictional amount of $10,000 as required by 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a). 2 The Supreme Court in Zahn affirmed the determination of
the district court that each plaintiff in the action, whether named or
unnamed, must meet the requisite jurisdictional amount. In Zahn only
the four named plaintiffs prosecuting the action claimed damages in ex-
cess of the $10,000 amount. Accordingly, the district court "refused
to permit the suit to proceed as a class action."3
The plaintiffs in Zahn were lake front property owners, on Lake
Champlain, Orwell, Vermont, who brought suit against International
Paper Company for alleged pollution of the Lake. The Company's
pulp and paper-making operation had discharged plant-waste into Ti-
conderoga Creek which empties into Lake Champlain. The waste cre-
ated a "massive sludge blanket on the bottom of the Lake [which] . . .
break off periodically to wash up on . . . [Plaintiffs'] property."4
There were over 200 members of the injured class, all lake front
property owners and lessees. The four named plaintiffs who instituted
the class action, each claimed damages in excess of $10,000. In addi-
tion, the entire class sought forty million dollars in compensatory and
punitive damages.' However, the district court did not find that each
property owner's damages were certain to the extent of the $10,000
requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) and refused to allow the suit to
proceed as a class action.6 This decision was prompted by interpreta-
tion of § 1332(a) as applied to class actions. Such requirement man-
dated that the matter in controversy be in excess of $10,000 as to each
plaintiff represented in the class action.
In cases prior to Zahn, it has been held that when several plaintiffs
with separate claims join their claims in a single suit, each must satisfy
the jurisdictional amount.7 Aggregation of separate and distinct claims
by different plaintiffs has not been permitted for the purpose of confer-
ring federal jurisdiction.8 Those plaintiffs who have not met the juris-
dictional amount have been dismissed.9 Finally, following the Su-
preme Court's recent ruling in Snyder v. Harris,10 a class action in
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), 72 STAT. 415 (1958):
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 exclusive of interest
and costs, and is between-
(1) citizens of different states. ...
3. 94 S. Ct. at 507.
4. 469 F.2d 1033, 1034.
5. Id.
6. 53 F.R.D. 430.
7. Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Company, 222 U.S. 39, 32 S. Ct. 9, 56 L Ed. 81
(1911).
8. Clark v. Paul Grey, 306 U.S. 583, 59 S. Ct. 744, 83 L. Ed. 1001 (1939).
9. Id. at 590.
10. 394 U.S. 332, 89 S. Ct. 1053, 22 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1969).
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which none of the plaintiffs could claim the requisite amount in contro-
versy, the Supreme Court concluded there could be no aggregation of
claims by plaintiffs in a 23(b)(3) action based on diversity of citizen-
ship. The same rationale precludes aggregation of claims in civil ac-
tions brought in federal district court on federal question jurisdiction."
The result of the Zahn decision was forecast by the holding of the
Supreme Court in Snyder. In fact the district court, in Zahn, relied
heavily on the holding of Snyder and the Supreme Court reaffirmed
its position. There could never be aggregation of separate and distinct
claims for the purpose of conferring diversity jurisdiction on the federal
district courts.'2
The reasoning behind Zahn appears by viewing three general propo-
sitions. First, there is a general policy, that is directed toward reducing
the case load on the federal district courts. Secondly, there is the judi-
cial policy of careful adherence to the rules governing class actions and
the Advisory Committee's Notes on class actions. 3 And thirdly, as
originally stated by the Supreme Court in Snyder, there is a policy that
"local controversies involving claims to be settled on the basis of state
law can often be most appropriately tried in state courts."' 4
The question in Zahn and in the prior cases cited reflected several
theories of aggregation of claims and determination of the amount in
controversy. The "classic dichtomy," as quoted in the decision was
described in the following manner:
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands,
unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that
the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount; but when
several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title of right, in which
they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their
interest collectively equal the jurisdictional amount. 5
Under the pre-1966 Federal Rules, Rule 23 class actions were di-
vided along the lines of the rights involved. 16 That is, if the action
was a true class action then the rights involved were joint or undivided
and aggregation of claims was allowed. But if the action was a so-
called "spurious" class action, the rights involved were "several" or in-
dividual, united only by common questions of law or fact, and aggrega-
tion was not permitted. "In practice the terms . . . proved obscure
11. 28 U.S.C. 2 1331(a) provides:
(a) The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
12. 94 S. Ct. at 507.
13. 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
14. 394 U.S. at 341.
15. 222 U.S. at 40-41.
16. 39 F.R.D. at 98.
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and uncertain."" The amendments to Rule 23 did away with the old
categories of 'true,' 'hybrid' and 'spurious' actions. The new Rule was
to be a "functional approach" to the maintenance of class actions.
With the amended rule came the challenge in Snyder, where none
of the plaintiffs met the jurisdictional requirement, but claimed that
with amendment of the rules, which did away with the distinctions be-
tween 'true' and 'spurious' it could be argued that aggregation of
independent claims was permissible, as it had been for the old 'true'
class action. The answer by the Court in Snyder to this proposal was
the admonition that
[T]he doctrine that separate and distinct claims could not be aggre-
gated was never, and is not now, based upon the categories of old
Rtile 23 or of any rule of procedure. That doctrine is based rather
upon this court's interpretation of the statutory phrase 'matter in con-
troversy'. 18
A further reason for rejecting aggregation, or any change in the defi-
nition of matter in controversy was the command of Rule 82 that "these
rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts ... "19
Thus, aggregation of claims remained improper under the Amended
Rules. Of importance were the amendments providing for notice and
the extent to which the jurisdiction of the court reached to all class
members who did not opt out. Notice is sent to all identifiable mem-
bers of a potential class and a judgment in the lawsuit is binding on
all members of the (b)(3) action unless they request exclusion.2"
Thus the court obtains jurisdiction over each proposed class member
and its jurisdictional requirement must be met by each member. Un-
der the old rule the judgment in a "spurious class action" did not bind
an individual not a party, the judgment now in a 23(b)(3) action,
whether favorable or unfavorable binds those to whom notice was di-
rected and who did not request exclusion. 2
The impact of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin was to further restrict
the usefulness of a Rule 23(b) (3) action. Not only must each litigant
claim damages in excess of $10,000, but also the original representa-
tives of the class must be prepared to bear the costly burden of notifica-
tion of all the identifiable members of the class. The cost of such a
17. Id.
18. 394 U.S. at 336..
19. Id. at 337.
20. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, - U.S. -, 40 L. Ed. 2d 732, 94 S. Ct. 2140
(1974). The holding in Eisen literally applies section (c)(2) in requiring the plaintiff
to send individual notice to all the identifiable class members, an almost overwhelming
burden and a financially disastrous one.
21. 39 F.R.D. at 105.
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suit, represented in terms of litigants' claims in damages, by the cost
of individual notice to all identifiable members as well as the cost of
the litigation itself, is clearly prohibitive. Under Eisen, at the outset
of litigation, a plaintiff is forced to incur substantial expenditures for
purposes related solely to the institution of his suit. The cost saving
factor, a major purpose of the class action device, has been eroded be-
yond repair.
The Statutes governing amount in controversy requirements for dis-
trict court jurisdiction have progressively been amended upwards.22
The purpose as stated by the Court of Appeals in Zahn was "to check
the rising caseload in the federal courts."23  Thus the answer affirmed
by the Supreme Court in their Zahn holding is satisfactory. Unless
some specific mention had been made in the amended Federal Rules,
there was no reason to change positions, to break with precedent. And
further, the difficulties inherent in allowing a case such as Zahn to pro-
ceed as a class action, where only four members met the jurisdictional
requirement would raise new problems.
One difficulty would lie in determining how many named plaintiffs
would be needed to establish a proper class, under which all unnamed
plaintiffs would not be required to show the requisite jurisdictional
amount. In an often quoted comment by the Advisory Committee, it
points out another area of confusion. The committee noted that a suit
based on a
mass accident resulting in injuries to numerous persons is ordinarily
not appropriate for a class action 'because of the likelihood that signi-
ficant questions, not only of damages but of liability and defense to
liability, would be present affecting the individuals in different ways. 24
This suggests that in a mass accident, the plaintiffs are precluded from
proceeding with a class action. Yet this presents one of the few imag-
inable situations where each member of the proposed class could meet
the amount in controversy requirement. Few of the environmental
case, ,uch as Zahn, could hope to sasfy necessar y d .ims ilcase .. . . ... . .. .. . ....... .. 11 ,, amage cla~---i n
the case of each individual. Many such suits seem perfectly con-
structed for a class action procedure meeting all the prerequisites of
a 23(b)(3) action, but fail for this reason alone.
The dissent in Zahn was based on a theory of ancillary jurisdiction. 25
Following a line of cases wherein ancillary or pendent jurisdiction has
obtained results, such as over "compulsory counter claims under Rule
13 (a) . . . cross claims permitted by 13(g), over impleaded defend-
22. 94 S. Ct. at 505, n.1.
23. 469 F.2d at 1035.
24. 39 F.R.D. at 103.
25. 94 S. Ct. at 512.
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ants under Rule 14", the dissent concludes that class actions "under
Rule 23(b)(3) are equally appropriate for such treatment. 26  That
is it would be equally consistent to base federal jurisdiction on the
plaintiffs originally named. Such was done with a diversity issue in Su-
preme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble27 where the original parties were
diverse as -to citizenship. There it was held that "the intervention of
nondiverse members of the class would not destroy the District Court's
jurisdiction."28  It is very unlikely that diversity class actions would
ever be maintained if every named and unnamed plaintiff had to meet
the diversity requirement. Practically speaking this theory should also
apply to the jurisdictional amount requirements. However the dissent
fails to understand why such a practical approach as taken in Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur must be abandoned where the purely statutory matter
in controversy requirement is concerned.
29
Inherent in the majority's opinion and equally stressed by the dissent,
are the difficulties in determining from the pleadings whether or not
each member of a proposed class does in fact meet the jurisdictional re-
quirement and whether intervention by the parties will be required for
the purposes "of establishing jurisdiction. .. "'0
Was it inevitable after Snyder that every "plaintiff in a Rule
23 (b) (3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any
plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case . . ."?"' The
Court in Zahn expressed the idea that "one plaintiff may not ride in
on another's coatails." 32
The basis for granting certiorari in Snyder arose from the conflict
in decisions in the several Circuit Courts. The first case from the
Eighth Circuit, was brought by Ms. Snyder individually and on behalf
of "all others similarly situated" with jurisdiction predicated on diversity
of citizenship. Though Ms. Snyder sought for herself only $8,740 in
damages, she represented over 4,000 shareholders of the Missouri Fi-
delity Union Trust Life Insurance Company. If aggregated the dam-
ages would approach $1,200,000. The district court held and the Cir-
cuit Court subsequently affirmed that the separate claims could not be
aggregated to satisfy the jurisdictional amount.33 This followed a sim-
ilar decision in the Fifth Circuit.34
26. Id. at 514.
27. 255 U.S. 356, 41 S. Ct. 338, 65 L. Ed. 673 (1921).
28. 41 S. Ct. at 342.
29. 94 S. Ct. at 516.
30. Id. at 517.
31. Id.
32. 469 F.2d at 1035.
33. 394 U.S. at 333.
34. Alvarez v. Pan American Life Ifsurance Company, 375 F.2d 992, cert. denied,
389 U.S. 827 (1967).
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At the same time, however, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit reached the opposite conclusion. It held
that 'because of a 1966 amendment to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure relating to class actions, separate and distinct
claims brought together in a class action could now be aggregated for
the purpose of establishing the jurisdictional amount in diversity
cases.
35
The plaintiff, Otto Coburn, had brought the suit against the Gas Service
Company in district court, personally alleging only $7.91 in damages.
Yet, he was attempting to represent in his class action 18,000 other
customers whose claims, when aggregated would be well in excess of
the $10,000 jurisdictional amount requirement. 6 Thus the facts in
Snyder can be differentiated from those presented in Zahn, and the lat-
ter case is distinguishable in that each of the four named plaintiffs had
claims in excess of the requisite amount and were properly before the
district court. The distinction that some plaintiffs meet the jurisdic-
tional amount and others do not was not enough to change the interpre-
tation of matter in controversy. Noting that the rules against aggrega-
tion have never been based upon a rule of procedure, the Court in Sny-
der stated that the relevant limitation on the matter in controversy sub-
stantially predate[d] the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ' '37
The argument that those
include(d) in the judgment . . . (will be) all members of the class
who do not ask to be out by a certain date, the matter in controversy
now encompasses all the claims of the entire class
was rejected by the Court in Snyder. Pointing out the opposite result
in the case of joinder, the Court said that
. .judgments under class actions formerly classified as spurious may
now have the same effect as claims brought under the joinder provi-
sions is certainly no reason to treat them differently from joined ac-
tions for purposes of aggregation.38
±wt U, aggregatfion of separate, distinct claims has not been
permitted in cases of joinder of plaintiffs. Though a different fact situ-
ation was present the case could not have been decided otherwise with-
out overruling Snyder and its precedents.
The Zahn ruling has had a considerable impact on 23(b) (3) class
actions, thus far. It has been interpreted by the district courts strictly
so that no class action, whether jurisdiction was predicated on 28 U.S.C.
35. 394 U.S. at 334.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 336.
38. Id. at 337.
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§ 1331 or § 1332, can be maintained unless all members, or a sufficient
number to constitute a class within the meaning of 23(b)(3), meet the
jurisdictional amount of $10,000.
In a recent North Carolina case, residents of Bogue Bank, Emerald
Isle sought to enjoin construction of a pier and marina because of al-
leged environmental destruction. 9 The named plaintiffs, who were
adjoining landlowners of the building site, alleged as damages claims
sufficient to establish jurisdiction for themselves, but
no such allegation [was] made with respect to any of the unnamed
members . . .and all persons who live and travel upon Bogue Banks
• ..who have interests in the preservation and enhancement of
the natural environment of the area. 40
The decision in the district court, based on Zahn, found the class action
procedure improper.
Any environmental suit brought as a class action under Rule
23(b)(3) may have an enormous impact on the set of all industrial
defendants as the potential number of defendants involved in such suits
is large. But, it is unlikely that enough individuals will be damaged to
the extent of $10,000. Though many potential plaintiffs may be injured
and the total damage claims may run into the millions of dollars, it is
clear that Zahn has created a roadblock to class actions so that such
individuals might be unable to vindicate their damages.
Recently an attempt to evade the strict rule of Zahn based on the
theory of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction, was defeated. In United
Pacific Reliance Insurance Companies v. City of Lewiston,41 the insur-
ance companies joined their claims arising out of a single fire against
the city. Several of the companies had damages of less than $10,000.
Arguing against dismissal of their claims, the petitioners sought to con-
vince the court that since the damages claimed all resulted from a single
factual situation, ancillary jurisdiction would be proper. Similar to
Zahn, only state law claims for damages were asserted, and the petition-
ers who did not meet the jurisdictional requirement of amount in con-
troversy were dismissed. It should be noted however that the district
court expressed the view that if "this case (were) . . . . to be decided
on practicalities, the result would seem to point to the exercise of juris-
diction."42
The purpose of the class action device is to meet the problems inher-
ent in multiple litigation with practical solutions to save time, energy
and money. It is impossible to say that either Zahn or Eisen moved
39. Rucker v. Willis, 358 F. Supp. 425 (E.D.N.C. 1973).
40. Id. at 426.
41. 372 F. Supp. 700 (D. Idaho 1974).
42. Id. at 704.
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toward fulfilling these goals. Thus a grave paradox exists. A single
claimant with several distinct, independent claims against a defendant
will find it possible to aggregate his claims to invoke federal jurisdiction
while two or more claimants with substantially similar claims are in the
awkward position of having to litigate such claims against the same indi-
vidual separately, if unable to meet the jurisdictional amount in contro-
versy requirements. The logic behind such a dichotomy is certainly
debilitating to even the keenest procedural stalwart. Though plaintiff's
seeking to vindicate their injuries in a federal court will find themselves
forumless, the results of Zahn will be less harsh in those states that have
provisions for class actions.4 3 It should be noted that the plaintiffs in
Zahn intended to continue their suit separately if their class action status
was terminated." When asked why the suit was not brought in state
court originally, the reply was that the alternative did not exist at that
time.
In retrospect, with the decision in Zahn followed by the result
reached in Eisen, there appears to be little hope for the large scale class
actions once envisioned. Perhaps such a class action procedure was
never meant to be. But, as it stands now clearly the price tag on such
actions is beyond the reach of most litigants. Consequently small
claims will go unvindicated unless potential plaintiffs do their forum
shopping in state courts.
MARY C. TOLTON
Friscia to Scarola:
Changing New York Case Law on Insurable Interest
in Stolen Automobiles
INTRODUCTION
In view of the incidence of car theft in the United States, it is appar-
ent that many automobile theft insurance policies are purchased by
bonafide purchasers of stolen cars. If such an automobile is subse-
quently stolen from the innocent purchaser and -the insurer discovers
that the insured buyer possessed a stolen vehicle, a troublesome ques-
43. N.C. GEN. STATS. lA-l, Rule 23, provides in part:
(a) Representation-If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make
it impractical to bring them all before the court, such of them one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or
be sued.
44. 42 U.S.L.W. 4233 (October 1973).
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